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Abstract
The best case for thinking that quantum mechanics is nonlocal rests on
Bell’s Theorem, and later results of the same kind. However, the corre-
lations characteristic of EPR-Bell (EPRB) experiments also arise in fa-
miliar cases elsewhere in QM, where the two measurements involved are
timelike rather than spacelike separated; and in which the correlations are
usually assumed to have a local causal explanation, requiring no action-at-
a-distance. It is interesting to ask how this is possible, in the light of Bell’s
Theorem. We investigate this question, and present two options. Either
(i) the new cases are nonlocal, too, in which case action-at-a-distance is
more widespread in QM than has previously been appreciated (and does
not depend on entanglement, as usually construed); or (ii) the means of
avoiding action-at-a-distance in the new cases extends in a natural way
to EPRB, removing action-at-a-distance in these cases, too. There is a
third option, viz., that the new cases are strongly disanalogous to EPRB.
But this option requires an argument, so far missing, that the physical
world breaks the symmetries which otherwise support the analogy. In
the absence of such an argument, the orthodox combination of views –
action-at-a-distance in EPRB, but local causality in its timelike analogue
– is less well established than it is usually assumed to be.
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“Our intuition, going back forever, is that to move, say, a rock, one has to
touch that rock, or touch a stick that touches the rock, or give an order
that travels via vibrations through the air to the ear of a man with a stick
that can then push the rock—or some such sequence. This intuition, more
generally, is that things can only directly affect other things that are right
next to them. If A affects B without being right next to it, then the effect
in question must be indirect—the effect in question must be something
that gets transmitted by means of a chain of events in which each event
brings about the next one directly, in a manner that smoothly spans the
distance from A to B. . . .
We term this intuition ‘locality.’
Quantum mechanics has upended many an intuition, but none deeper
than this one. And this particular upending carries with it a threat, as yet
unresolved, to special relativity—a foundation stone of our 21st-century
physics.” ([1], p. 32.)
1 Introduction
The remarks above give vivid expression to a common view about quantum
mechanics (QM), viz., that it reveals the existence of some sort of action-at-a-
distance (AAD) in the physical world, in deep tension with our intuition that
causation always acts locally. While this view of the implications of QM is not
universal, it is popular enough to be termed an orthodoxy – the AAD Orthodoxy,
as we shall call it. Our aim in this paper is to present a new challenge to the
AAD Orthodoxy. We argue that it is significantly less well-grounded than it is
widely assumed to be. We aim to show that the case for AAD in QM – and
with it, the case for thinking that QM carries “a threat, as yet unresolved, to
special relativity” – has not yet been made.
In the interests of clarity, we wish to distinguish our argument from other
challenges to the AAD Orthodoxy. For this reason, we set aside from the be-
ginning the Everett or “Many Worlds” interpretation of QM. The status of the
AAD Orthodoxy in the Everett picture remains controversial – see, e.g., [8] and
[22] for recent expressions of conflicting viewpoints on this matter. We take no
stand on this issue, and restrict our discussion to single-outcome views of QM.
We note, however, that if supporters of the Everett interpretation subscribe to
the AAD Orthodoxy in the conditional sense that they take rival views of QM
to be committed to AAD, then they, too, are amongst our targets.
In a similar spirit, we set aside other objections to the AAD Orthodoxy,
such as the view that the novel spacelike correlations revealed by QM are not
causal in nature, or do not involve action at a distance; and the view that QM
has an epistemic or instrumental function, and hence is not in the business of
describing the causal structure of reality.1 Again, our arguments may be of
1See, e.g., [36] and [10] for the former viewpoint, and [17] for an introduction to the latter.
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interest to proponents of such views in various indirect ways; but we shall not
ourselves engage with these rivals to the AAD Orthodoxy.2
1.1 Background
The challenge that QM poses to local causality, and hence to special rela-
tivity, stems from a feature of the theory called entanglement. The relevant
consequences of entanglement emerge in the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) experiment, and especially in John Bell’s [5] famous analysis of a version
of EPR proposed by David Bohm. We refer to these cases, generically, as EPRB
experiments. (We describe a particular example in §2 below.)
EPRB experiments display distinctive patterns of correlations between the
outcomes of measurements on separated pairs of quantum systems. These cor-
relations seem at first sight to invite explanation in terms of a “common cause”
– i.e., in terms of some correlation between the underlying properties of the two
systems, established when they interact in their common past, and responsible
for the outcomes of the measurements concerned. However, Bell showed that
under seemingly uncontroversial assumptions, such a common cause explana-
tion is not possible, in some cases. In these cases, a common cause explanation
would require that the joint probabilities of measurement outcomes satisfy a
condition – Bell’s Inequality – whose violation is predicted by QM (and now
well confirmed by experiment).
Bell’s result is often regarded simply as a difficulty for the hidden variable
(HV) program in QM, but as Albert and Galchen emphasise in the piece from
which we quoted above, to see it this way is greatly to underestimate its signifi-
cance. Bell’s analysis shows that in many cases, the joint probability of pairs of
outcomes for possible measurements on each of two entangled particles, cannot
be expressed as a product of a probability for each outcome individually, if the
latter probabilities are not allowed to depend in each case on the setting chosen
for a measurement on the other particle.3 This interdependence in the joint
probabilities is the main basis for the view that QM entails AAD. (We refer
readers to Bell’s late paper [6] and to [25], for clear accounts of these points.)
1.2 Outline of the argument
Our challenge to the AAD Orthodoxy goes like this. We begin with an EPRB
experiment involving polarization measurements on photon pairs. We then note
that the characteristic pattern of correlations between measurement settings and
outcomes in this experiment also arises in a familiar experiment involving re-
peated polarization measurements on a single photon. In this case, which we
2Some readers may feel that, rightly or wrongly, the view that QM reveals AAD is not
sufficiently widespread to be called an orthodoxy. But since we are criticising the view, rather
than trying to appeal to it as established fact, this is merely a terminological point. Readers
should feel free to substitute their own label. We recommend [25] for a clear recent presentation
of the view, as we take it to be.
3While the probabilities here are conditional on any hidden variables which may be present
in the systems in question, the result does not require that there be any such variables.
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call the Sideways EPRB experiment (SEPRB), the two polarization measure-
ments have a timelike separation, rather than the spacelike separation possible
in EPRB. The correlations in SEPRB are not normally thought be a manifesta-
tion of AAD – on the contrary, they are usually assumed to have a “local” causal
explanation, given by the standard QM description. But if SEPRB manages to
avoid AAD, despite exhibiting the same pattern of correlations as EPRB, it is
interesting to ask how it does so.
Investigating this question, we present the following three options:
I. SEPRB involves a kind of AAD, too, in which case AAD is much more
widespread in QM than has previously been appreciated (and does not
depend on entanglement, as usually construed).
II. The means of avoiding AAD in SEPRB extends in a natural way to EPRB,
eliminating AAD (and hence its conflict with special relativity) in these
cases, also.
III. SEPRB is more disanalogous to EPRB than is evident from the mathe-
matics, so that the means of avoiding AAD in the former does not extend
to the latter.
Option II amounts to a direct challenge to the AAD Orthodoxy. From the point
of view of the Orthodoxy, then, the acceptable options are I and III.
But neither of these options (I or III) is “cost-free”. On the one hand,
Option I conflicts not only with the standard view of where AAD originates in
QM, but also – as the other side of the same coin – with the widely accepted
“intuitive” picture of the explanation of quantum correlations in the SEPRB
cases (and many others like them). On the other hand, Option III requires
rejection of some attractive symmetries, which otherwise support the analogy
between SEPRB and EPRB. So the AAD Orthodoxy has some work to do, to
convince us that one of these choices is really more plausible than Option II.
We emphasize that this argument does not show that the AAD Orthodoxy
is false. But it does show that it cannot be regarded as well-justified, in the
absence of a case – so far largely non-existent – for preferring Options I or III
to Option II. The Orthodoxy may perhaps be true, in other words; but it is not
presently well-grounded.
As we note below, symmetry-based objections to the AAD Orthodoxy have
been offered before. Our argument is novel in two main respects. First, it ex-
ploits a timelike variant of the kind of experiment (i.e., EPRB) usually supposed
to provide the strongest case for AAD in QM. This enables our symmetry ar-
gument to take an unusually direct form. In effect, we simply point out that
whatever ontology underlies the local causality in SEPRB will do the same
job in EPRB, so long as the symmetries hold. Secondly, and relatedly, the
EPRB/SEPRB comparison enables us to appeal to a second kind of symmetry
argument, in addition to the time-symmetry central to earlier proposals.
Finally, we emphasize that we do not claim that these symmetry arguments
cannot be challenged. On the contrary, we shall stress at several points that
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one option for the AAD Orthodoxy, in the face of our argument, is to reject
these symmetries. But a would-be defender of the Orthodoxy who announces
that she takes this option (i.e., Option III, in the list above) has not given us an
argument, but only an IOU. To defend the Orthodoxy (by this route), she needs
to make a case that the symmetries fail. In the absence of such an argument,
the AAD view is no more than one hypothesis among several live options.
2 The experiments
2.1 Standard EPRB
Figure 1: EPRB (with photons).
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Figure 1 shows a familiar version of an EPRB experiment, performed with
pairs of photons. Photons emitted in a back-to-back geometry from a two-
photon-decay at M (say, a 2s−1s transition in Hydrogen) reach ideal polarizing
cubes A and B whose orientations α and β, respectively, may be freely and in-
dependently chosen by two experimenters. Subsequent detection of each photon
has two possible results; transmission (A=1, B=1) or reflection (A=0, B=0).
(Bold capitals represent Boolean variables.) Before measurement, the photons
are described by an entangled state of zero total angular momentum, usually
interpreted to imply that neither photon has a determinate polarization. Af-
ter one measurement is made, however, the typical interpretation is that both
photons acquire a determinate polarization based upon the orientation of the
polarizer and the measurement result. The joint probability Pr(A = B) of the
same result at A and B is known to be cos2(α− β), violating Bell’s Inequality,
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and therefore impossible to replicate with hidden variables at M that do not
depend on the settings α and β.
2.2 Sideways EPRB
Figure 2 shows the spacetime diagram for the Sideways EPRB (SEPRB) exper-
iment. The latter polarizing cube at B is exactly the same as in EPRB; it is
set at an angle β, and the measurement B indicates whether the photon was
transmitted or reflected in the cube.
C = 0 C = 1
B = 1B = 0
Figure 2: Sideways EPRB (SEPRB).
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Pr(B = C) = cos2(γ − β)
For any B-measurement to take place, a photon must first reflect from the
mirror. In order to reach the mirror, the photon must pass through an earlier
polarizer at C. This polarizer is set at an angle γ (meaning that transmitted
photons have a polarization aligned with γ). There are two ways for an experi-
menter to introduce a single photon along the appropriate trajectory: (1) it can
be injected from the right (C=1), followed by a successful transmission through
the polarizing cube (giving it a polarization aligned with γ), or (2) it can be
injected from the left (C=0), followed by a successful reflection in the polarizing
cube. The latter case leaves the photon with a polarization aligned with γ+pi/2.
Here C is a boolean variable that does not represent an experimental outcome,
but rather an input choice made by the experimentalist.
If the experimenter chooses C=1, it is well known that the probability
of B=1 is given by cos2(β − γ). On the other hand, if the experimenter
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chooses C=0, then the probability of B=0 is now cos2(β − γ). So the cor-
relation between the experimenter’s choice C and the measurement outcome B
is Pr(B = C) = cos2(β−γ). The polarization of the input to the first polarizing
cube is irrelevant, so long as one considers a null result at B to be no experiment
at all. Note that the mirror is included only for heuristic purposes, to emphasise
the similarities between this case and the standard EPRB experiment in Figure
1. We could equally place the first polarizing cube at T, and remove the mirror.
2.3 Comparing the experiments
SEPRB involves exactly the same pattern of correlations between distant mea-
surement events as EPRB. In both cases, the widely-separated events have a
correlation of the form cos2(α−β), where α and β are freely and independently
variable by the experimenters concerned. As is well known (and experimentally
well confirmed), the correlations in EPRB violate Bell’s Inequality, and it is this
fact, in combination with the assumptions of Bell’s derivation of his Inequality,
that is taken to entail that EPRB involves AAD.
Since SEPRB displays the same correlations as EPRB, it, too, must violate
Bell’s Inequality. Does this imply that SEPRB involves AAD? No, or at least not
automatically, for it may well be that one or more of the assumptions required
for the derivation of Bell’s Inequality in EPRB do not hold in SEPRB. This is
the possibility we wish to investigate, for we are interested in the question as to
whether the way in which these assumptions are thought to fail in SEPRB might
throw light on how they might fail in EPRB, too (thus blocking the argument
to AAD in that case). To clarify our argument at this point, we now introduce
a brief description of the structure of the derivation of Bell’s Inequality.
The basis of the derivation of Bell’s Inequality is depicted in Figure 3. There
are two crucial assumptions. The first, Independence, requires that any HVs λ
be independent of the choice of measurement settings m2 and m1 at M2 and
M1, respectively. The second, Locality, specifies that any correlation between
m2 and the measurement outcome at M1 be “screened off” by the value λR of
λ in some spacetime region R, disjoint from the past light cone of M2. In other
words, the measurement outcome at M1 is probabilistically independent of m2,
when we hold fixed the value of λR.4 (We may think of the measurements M2
and M1 as corresponding to those at A and B, respectively, in EPRB.)
4An analogous condition is also assumed in the opposite direction, applying to correlations
between the setting m1 and the measurement outcome at M2. And both conditions normally
refer also to “unhidden” variables relevant to the outcomes of M1 and M2 – indeed, it is
crucial that the screening-off condition hold fixed everything in R, and not merely HVs. For
simplicity we have here suppressed these points, but again refer readers to [6] and [25] for
details. (Our Figure 3 is based on one given by Bell in [6].)
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Figure 3: Independence and Locality in Bell’s Theorem
It is important to note that although the fact that M2 and M1 have space-
like separation plays a major part in the intuitive justification of Independence
and (especially) Locality, it plays no role whatsoever in the derivation of Bell’s
Inequality, once these assumptions are in place. Hence, if there were a mea-
surement M3 with setting m3 in the past light cone of M1 such that λR was
independent of the choice of m3 (Independence) and any correlation between m3
and the outcome at M1 was screened off by λR (Locality), then Bell’s Inequality
could be derived for this case, too. So if the actual correlations in such a case
turned out to violate Bell’s Inequality, we would have a demonstration that at
least one of Independence or Locality must fail. If Independence was assumed
to hold, then it would have to be Locality that failed. This would entail a form
of AAD – in this case, action-at-a-timelike-distance.5 In other words, it would
involve a direct influence of the choice of m3 on the outcome at M1, bypassing
conditions in R, of the kind prohibited by Locality.
Applying this hypothetical form of reasoning to SEPRB, with C in place
of M3 and B in place of M1, it entails that if Independence were to hold in
SEPRB, we could use the fact that the SEPRB correlations (being the same
as the EPRB correlations) do not satisfy Bell’s Inequality to infer that there
is AAD in SEPRB. It would then have turned out that AAD in QM does not
require a second particle, let alone entanglement as normally conceived.
Few people would interpret SEPRB in this way, of course.6 On the contrary,
we find it natural to assume that in SEPRB the state of the photon between the
polarizers does depend on the setting γ, so that Independence fails. This is why,
despite some formal similarities between SEPRB and EPRB, the correlations
of the former seem unproblematic, while the correlations of the latter seem
“spooky” – why the latter but not the former seem to require AAD.
5Intuitively, action at a spatial distance allows a change at one place to produce a change
at a remote place, with no change at all on paths in between. Action at a temporal distance
allows a change at one time to produce a change at a remote time, with no change at times in
between. Both conflict with the intuition that causation acts “locally” and “continuously”.
6Though see [9] for an apparent exception.
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2.4 The need for beables
At this point it is crucial to observe that this way of avoiding AAD in SEPRB
requires that we regard the photon as possessing a “beable”, in Bell’s terminol-
ogy, to provide the intermediary between the setting at C and the measurement
at B. Whether the quantum state itself can play this role depends on how it
is interpreted. A purely epistemic state is not a beable, for example. Nor is a
state which merely describes an ensemble of systems, leaving it open whether
the individual photon possesses a property sufficient to carry the information
about C’s setting from C to B.
In order to avoid the conclusion that SEPRB involves AAD, we therefore
need to make explicit that there is a beable of some kind – perhaps the quantum
state, appropriately interpreted, perhaps some other ontic state – capable of
carrying the information about a measurement setting from C to B. Since it
does the job of carrying information from C, we shall call it the C-beable. The
notation “C-beable:[γ]” in Figure 4 thus represents the fact that the C-beable
carries the information that C’s polarizer setting is γ. We shall say that such a
beable provides a Locality Model for SEPRB.7
C = 0 C = 1
B = 1B = 0
Figure 4: The intuitive causal explanation in SEPRB: a beable
carries information about the C setting to B.
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7For completeness, we note that in principle one might devise a Locality Model in which
the information about the measurement setting at C is carried to B by something other than
a beable of the photon; i.e., with a different mechanism altogether for “action-by-contact”
between C and B. This option might evade our symmetry arguments below, but we think it
unlikely to appeal to any defender of “intuitive causality” in SEPRB.
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The next step is to appeal to symmetry considerations, to call attention
to the possibility that a Locality Model for SEPRB might transform into a
Locality Model for EPRB, too, under application of some suitable symmetry.
Our goal here is to show that if one accepts the following two assumptions –
(i) that there is a Locality Model for SEPRB, and (ii) that the beables of this
Locality Model respect certain symmetries – then one must accept that there is
a Locality Model for EPRB, too. (In other words, one must accept that there
are beables to mediate what would otherwise be AAD in SEPRB, in conflict
with the AAD Orthodoxy.) This leaves the AAD Orthodoxy with the choice of
rejecting assumption (i) or rejecting assumption (ii); and our challenge to the
Orthodoxy is to say which assumption it rejects, and why.
It turns out that there are two largely independent symmetries, either one of
which could play the part required in this argument. We present them in turn.
3 The symmetry considerations
3.1 The action symmetry
If beables can explain the correlations seen in SEPRB, it is natural to ask
whether the identical correlations in EPRB might be explained in an analogous
manner. Indeed, these two experiments are more than superficially similar; they
span bounded regions of spacetime with precisely the same electromagnetic ac-
tion S. It should therefore be no surprise that the experimental correlations in
EPRB and SEPRB are identical, as our most advanced theory of these inter-
actions – quantum electrodynamics (QED) – reduces the joint probability to a
functional integral of the classical action:
P [A(t0), A(tf )] =
∣∣∣∣∫ DAeiS[A]/~∣∣∣∣2 . (1)
Here A is the electromagnetic 4-potential, and the integral is over all field
configurations consistent with the initial boundary A(t0), the final boundary
A(tf ), and any spatial boundaries (such as the mirror). If we post-select the
EPRB measurement outcome to match the input choice in SEPRB (A=C),
and also filter the photons in EPRB such that they are the same wavelength,
then there is an exact “action symmetry” (S-symmetry) between these two
experiments for any given outcome B. (This is related to “crossing symmetry”
in quantum field theory.)
To see this explicitly, consider the following action-preserving permutation of
SEPRB. Taking the “bottom half” of the rectangular spacetime region bounded
by the mirror and the polarizers (the shaded region in Figure 4), one can flip
the contents of this sub-region from left-to-right, and then again future-to-past,
without changing the global action. Then, one can imagine removing this sub-
region from its location before the unshaded “top half” of the experiment, and
re-affixing it to a new spacetime location to the left of the “top half”, again with-
out changing the action. This procedure results in the EPRB geometry, where
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C → A. The only complication is at the vertex where the photon worldlines
meet, but notice that both the mirror (in SEPRB) and the two photon decay
(in EPRB) serve to correlate the polarization of the two photons in the same
manner, so no action boundary terms are introduced or lost in this process.8
Given that S is the same, the only difference between the use of Eqn. (1) in
the two experiments (for a given B outcome) is whether the C input condition
is constrained by A(t0) (SEPRB) or the A output condition is constrained
by A(tf ) (EPRB). But as far as Eqn. (1) is concerned, this is no difference
at all; joint probabilities don’t distinguish past from future. Eqn. (1) thus
offers a natural explanation of the fact that both experiments display the same
correlations; they result from the same QED mathematics.9 (Note that the
addition of any physical faster-than-light communication channel between A
and B in EPRB would break the S-symmetry.)
Does this symmetry in the mathematics entail a corresponding symmetry
in the ontology underlying EPRB and SEPRB? That conclusion would be too
strong, in our view. For one thing, QED does not provide an accepted physical
interpretation of these correlations, so we should be more than usually cautious
about reading ontology from, or into, the mathematics, in this case. For another,
we want to leave open the option that there simply is no underlying ontology,
in either case.
A weaker conclusion suffices for our purposes, however. The crucial point
is that the symmetry in the mathematics offers the prospect of a clear road to
anyone who wishes to exploit the S-symmetry to transform a Locality Model
for SEPRB into a Locality Model for EPRB – at least, a clear road so far as
the mathematics is concerned. So long as the ontology of a Locality Model for
SEPRB lives in spacetime, this action-preserving permutation of the geometry
(from that of SEPRB to that of EPRB) provides a simple QED-inspired tem-
plate for a corresponding permutation of the ontology. While QED provides no
guarantee that the ontology of the real world respects this symmetry, it certainly
raises the possibility that it might do so. (One might even say – not wishing to
be too bold – that it offers us a hint that it might do so.) This is the possibility
that the AAD Orthodoxy must find reason to reject, if it is to make a case for
the claim that there is a Locality Model for SEPRB but not for EPRB.10
Our challenge to the AAD Orthodoxy is thus to propose some such roadblock
– some reason for thinking that the ontology of SEPRB and EPRB does not
reflect the symmetry of the mathematics. In the absence of such a roadblock,
the transformation of a Locality Model for SEPRB into a Locality Model for
EPRB proceeds as follows. It begins with the intuitive interpretation of SEPRB,
as in Figure 4, and then applies the S-symmetry permutation described above,
8For ease of exposition, we are now treating the reflected photon in SEPRB as a “new”
photon, distinct from the incident photon, as reflection in QED is typically interpreted.
9The use of these joint probabilities in QED may not be familiar to readers used to the
conditional probabilities of non-relativistic QM, but Leifer [20] has demonstrated an isomor-
phism between these two types of probability, and arrives at a similar conclusion concerning
a symmetry between EPRB-like and SEPRB-like experiments.
10One of the tasks that falls on the Orthodoxy, if it rejects S-symmetry at the level of
ontology, is to explain the evident success of QED’s S-symmetric formalism.
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to produce Figure 5.
In Figure 5, the A-beable is correlated with a future measurement setting.
This is certainly counterintuitive, in the sense that it conflicts with what physi-
cists often refer to as “intuitive causality”. While it has often been noted that
such a beable would allow us to violate Bell’s Inequality with local hidden vari-
ables (see, e.g., [4], [11]–[15], [18], [23], [24], [27]–[32], [35], [37]–[39], [41], [42]),
most commentators have thought the cost too high to pay. We return below to
the question of what this cost actually amounts to.
A-beable:[α]
Figure 5: The SERPB explanation applied to EPRB yields a
model with a beable that depends on the measurement setting α.
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For the moment, ignoring such issues, we focus simply on the evident sym-
metry between EPRB and SEPRB. Our point is that rejecting A-beables in
EPRB, while accepting C-beables in SEPRB, requires one to reject at the onto-
logical level the S-symmetry revealed at the mathematical level by the identical
electromagnetic action of both EPRB and SEPRB.11
Still, another symmetry remains violated in Figure 5; a spatial symmetry.
To enforce a strict parallel between Figures 4 and 5, we must post-condition
on outcome A, leaving outcome B to be determined by the joint probabil-
ity Pr(A=B). But such one-sided post-conditioning should not be sufficient to
break the spatial symmetry between A and B. In order to recover spatial sym-
metry, one needs to treat the future settings α and β on an equal footing, leading
to both A-beables and B-beables, as shown in Figure 6 (instead of Figure 5).
11It seems likely that a rejection of S-symmetry would also require non-trivial modifications
to QED itself.
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A-beable:[α]
B-beable:[β]
Figure 6: What spatial symmetry requires – beables carry
the information about the B setting to A, and vice versa.
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Figure 7: What time-symmetry requires – a second
beable carries information about the B setting to C.
C-beable:[γ]B-beable:[β]
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Under S-symmetry, recovering a strict spatial symmetry in EPRB is equiva-
lent to recovering a strict temporal symmetry in SEPRB. This is easily seen by
applying S-symmetry to Figure 5 (the A↔C map) yielding the time-symmetric
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Figure 7. Figures 6 and 7 represent ontologies that each require beables sensi-
tive to both measurement settings. The spatially-symmetric geometry of EPRB
results in a fully spatially-symmetric ontology; the time-symmetric geometry of
SEPRB results in a fully time-symmetric ontology; the two ontologies are also
S-symmetric with respect to each other.
S-symmetry thus provides one path by which a Locality Model for SEPRB
might be transformed into a Locality Model for EPRB. We stress, once again,
that our principle conclusion at this point is not that the path is indubitably
open, but rather that onus lies with the AAD Orthodoxy to show that it is
closed.
3.2 Time-symmetry in SEPRB
In the proposal above, time-symmetry in a Locality Model for SEPRB emerged
from the application of two other symmetries: S-symmetry, and spatial symme-
try within EPRB. Our second symmetry proposal reverses the order of priority.
It begins, like the first, by assuming a Locality Model for SEPRB; but then
appeals directly to time-symmetry, noting that unless the Locality Model in
question is time-asymmetric, it also yields a Locality Model for EPRB. We
stress in advance that this second proposal does not depend on – or imply –
strict S-symmetry, and hence is impervious to challenges based on objections to
S-symmetry.12
We noted above that the intuitive strategy for avoiding AAD in the SEPRB
experiment requires a C-beable to encode the information about the setting of
polarizer C, making this information available at B. We now raise the question:
Is there also a B-beable which encodes the information about the setting of
polarizer B (as in Figure 7)? If the usual quantum state ψ is regarded as a
beable, and we assume the projection postulate, then the answer to this question
is “No”. As many writers have noted, this means that such interpretations are
time-asymmetric. Some have seen this as an objection, others as a reason for
thinking that physics is not time-symmetric, at a fundamental level. But as has
also been noted, time-symmetry can be restored by introducing a second wave
function considered as carrying information about future interactions [2, 39, 41]
or by using second-order (in time) wave equations constrained by both past and
future interactions [42]. In these cases, provided that the wave functions have
the status of beables, we do have B-beables.
Again, our interest is not in the usual quantum description as such, but in
the beables – whatever they may be – required to avoid AAD, in the SEPRB
experiment. Our point is simply that unless a Locality Model for SEPRB is
time-asymmetric, it must contain B-beables, as well as C-beables.
Let us suppose for the moment that our Locality Model for SEPRB is time-
symmetric in the manner shown in Figure 7. It is now a simple matter to
show that this use of beables correlated with future settings also provides the
12 A weaker claim is true in reverse. Since S-symmetry maps a spatial-symmetry to a time-
symmetry, a principled objection to the time-symmetry in question (without a corresponding
reason to doubt the spatial-symmetry) would be an objection to S-symmetry, too.
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resources to remove AAD from EPRB. As shown in Figure 6, beables correlated
with future measurement settings are available to the source, M. Then, provided
we require that the source produce pairs of particles with correlated beables,
that information will be available to both future measurements at A and B.
Thus, as we wanted to show, a time-symmetric Locality Model for SEPRB
easily extends to a Locality Model for EPRB.
4 The basic trilemma
We have shown that there are two symmetry-based strategies for extending a
Locality Model for SEPRB to a Locality Model for EPRB. The first strategy
appeals to S-symmetry directly. It then invokes spatial symmetry in EPRB, in
order to produce a spatially-symmetric Locality Model for EPRB, and thence
(by a second application of S-symmetry), a time-symmetric Locality Model for
SEPRB. The second strategy appeals to time-symmetry in the context of the
original Locality Model for SEPRB. It points out that time-symmetry in this
context requires B-beables, and that these may then be used to generate a
Locality Model for EPRB, too.
With these strategies on the table, we are confronted immediately by the
three options we identified in §1.2, and which we shall now call the Basic
Trilemma:
I. More AAD than we thought. We can reject the project of finding a
Locality Model for SEPRB altogether, and conclude that AAD is much
more widespread in QM than is usually supposed. We thus reject the in-
tuitive causal model for SEPRB (and presumably a vast number of similar
cases).
II. Less AAD than we thought. We can put our faith in the project
of exploring symmetric Locality Models, which account in an action-by-
contact (and hence potentially Lorentz-invariant) way for both the EPRB
and SEPRB cases.
III. As much AAD as we thought, but less symmetry. We can continue
to maintain that there is local causality in SEPRB but AAD in EPRB,
provided we reject both the symmetries that otherwise take us from a
Locality Model for SEPRB to a Locality Model for EPRB.
We take Option III to be the standard and “intuitive” view, at least among
proponents of the AAD Orthodoxy (whose intuitions have long since become
hardened to AAD). We have not excluded this option, but we have argued
that it incurs a cost, in symmetry terms. If we choose it, we commit our-
selves to the view that the ontology that underlies local causality in SEPRB
is neither S-symmetric, in the sense embodied in the formalism of QED, nor
time-symmetric.13
13Though see also §6 on the latter point.
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At this point, proponents of the AAD Orthodoxy thus have a choice to make.
Should they renounce Option III in favour of Option I, or should they make a
stand on the failure of these symmetries? For the purposes of this paper, we
shall not pursue those who make the former choice (i.e., Option I). They move
in the direction of a less realist conception of QM, and hence off our map, for
present purposes.
Our main conclusion is that those who remain – in other words, those ad-
vocates of the AAD Orthodoxy who reject Option I – now owe us a defence of
Option III. That is, they need an argument for preferring Option III to Option
II: a reason for thinking that the ontology underlying the true Locality Model
for SEPRB does not respect the symmetries that would transform it into a
Locality Model for EPRB.
4.1 An intuitive defence of Option III?
It might seem that one way to produce such an argument would be simply to
appeal to ordinary causal intuitions, something like this:14
“We look at the sideways EPRB case and say: the intuitive expla-
nation involves a photon propagating from the first measurement to
the second, where the state of the photon depends on the setting and
outcome of the first measurement. We look at the normal EPRB case
and say: the intuitive explanation involves two photons, propagat-
ing in opposite directions to their respective measuring apparatuses
and carrying no information about the settings of the apparatuses.
The first intuition provides our reason for rejecting Option I. The
second intuition then provides our reason for favouring Option III;
for these two intuitions are only compatible if the symmetries are
not a good guide to the relation between the underlying ontology in
the two cases.”
However, in relying on causal intuitions in support of Option III, this argu-
ment is limited in a crucial respect. The AAD Orthodoxy has already accepted
that QM requires us to jettison another of our long-cherished causal intuitions,
viz., the belief that there is no action-at-a-distance. This makes it difficult, to
say the least, for the Orthodoxy to take the high ground in appealing to other
causal intuitions. For the obvious rejoinder will be, “Why not sacrifice one of
those sacred cows, rather than the principle that there is no AAD?”
Both sides in this debate agree that QM shows that “something has to give”:
some element in our intuitive causal picture must go. The AAD Orthodoxy
is committed to a particular view about what should go, i.e., that we must
sacrifice local causality. But if this is to be a reasoned position, rather than a
mere expression of taste, it needs to be based on an argument for Option III
that breaks out of the circle of appeals to intuition.
14We borrow some of the following text from an anonymous referee.
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The same is true for the AAD Orthodoxy’s opponents, of course. But they
have an obvious candidate for an independent arbiter, in the tension between
AAD and special relativity. An appeal to special relativity in support of Option
II is an appeal to physics, not merely to ordinary intuitions about causality.
So intuition alone cannot provide an adequate defence of Option III. This
does not imply, of course, that no other defence can be found. (We mention some
other candidates in §7 below.) Our point is simply that such an argument needs
to be found, if the AAD Orthodoxy is to be regarded as well established (and
if Option I is rejected). Without such an argument, the case for the Orthodoxy
is seriously incomplete.
5 Avoiding the trilemma?
Some readers may feel that the apparent need to make a choice between these
three options only arises if we have not properly learnt the lessons of QM. We
anticipate a range of objections of this kind. From one side, it may be claimed
that our whole discussion is premissed on excessive (“na¨ıve”) realism about the
quantum world: “Avoid such realism, as QM shows us that we must, and your
trilemma will melt away.” From a different angle, it may be objected that we
have not understood that the only real ontology in the quantum world is the
wave function, as recommended by the Everett view; and that this view simply
transcends the concerns about locality on which our discussion has been based.
We cannot do justice here to all such objections, and in any case stipulated
at the beginning that we were setting these views to one side, for the purposes of
this paper. However, we would like to stress two general points. First, since such
objections (of the former kind, especially) align themselves most naturally with
Option I, we emphasise the strength of ordinary causal intuitions, in the SEPRB
case. One way to stress this point is to note that SEPRB can easily be used for
signalling, and hence for remote control of macroscopic processes.15 Rejecting
the intuitive causal picture in such cases, whether on antirealist, Everettian or
other grounds, is not a step to be taken lightly.16 Our central argument has
been that if it is not rejected in these cases, it need not (and should not) be
rejected in EPRB either; unless some reason can be found for breaking some
otherwise plausible symmetries.
Second, we note that the relative merits of the views of QM which lie behind
these objections – e.g., of the Everett view on one side, or of instrumentalist
views on the other – depend on the disadvantages of alternative approaches. In
particular, they depend on the viability or otherwise of HV approaches. Our
claim is that in so far as the apparent disadvantages of HV views rest on Bell’s
15The crucial disanalogy with EPRB, which prevents signalling in the latter case, is that
in SEPRB we have direct control of the input at C; whereas in EPRB we cannot control the
outcome at A, fixing it only by post-selection.
16It seems to commit us to the view that an effect may be separated from its cause by an
arbitrarily long period of time in which the world is exactly as it would be, had the cause not
occurred – for this is what failure of Locality amounts to, in the timelike case, as Figure 3
illustrates.
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Theorem (and, indeed, on other No Hidden Variable results relying on similar
assumptions about the independence of HVs from future measurement settings),
the case for the negative may have been seriously overstated. It has not usually
been felt that cases such as SEPRB provide any intuitive difficulties for a HV
explanation; and yet these cases, combined with the symmetries, seem to provide
the resources needed to account for EPRB cases as well. Unless some argument
can be found why the symmetries need to be broken, this aspect of any case
against HV views is considerably weaker than it is usually assumed to be.
6 The classical objection
In partial defense of the acceptability of Option III in our trilemma, it might
be claimed that the time-asymmetry of a Locality Model for SEPRB with C-
beables but no B-beables need not be fundamental; so that such a model need
not conflict with the assumed time-symmetry of the fundamental ontology. Jus-
tification for such a claim might be sought in classical electromagnetism (CEM),
which uses manifestly time-symmetric equations to yield the same cos2(β − γ)
ratio between the output intensity at B=C and the intensity after the polarizer
at C. This is Malus’s Law, and such a correlation seems to have no need for a
fundamental time-asymmetry (or retrocausality, for that matter).
But accomplishing this feat for CEM is not the same as explaining single-
photon correlations. Mapping the continuous parameter (β − γ) onto a contin-
uous set of possible outcomes in CEM is not analogous to mapping the same
parameter onto the two actual outcomes B=0 or B=1 in the single-photon
case.17 One could accomplish this continuous → discrete transition with some-
thing like QM’s projection postulate, but this would break the time-symmetry
of the ontology itself.
It is true that we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that someone might
suggest a new level of description, where the time-asymmetric use of C-beables
but not B-beables would merely be a product of special initial conditions (and
not a time-asymmetric ontology). To put this possibility in perspective, how-
ever, we offer the following comment.
At familiar scales, physics is dominated by special initial conditions (now
widely believed to be associated with the low entropy condition of the universe,
after the big bang). The resulting asymmetries are statistical in nature, and
associated with mean behaviour of very large numbers of interactions. There
are two possible views about what we should expect when we study individual
interactions themselves. One is that the familiar initial-condition-dependent
asymmetries will be absent at this level, the other is that they will emerge
again, in some new statistical level underlying our current description. It is
17This point can be strengthened if we accept an argument proposed in [33] for the con-
clusion that the discreteness of the quantum description introduces a new kind of boundary-
condition-independent correlation between beables and settings; and hence guarantees retro-
causality, in a Locality Model for SEPRB, if the ontology (i) is time-symmetric, and (ii) does
not restore continuity in the possible outputs, e.g., by means of an ontic wave function.
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important to recognise that both paths remain open to physics, but even more
important not to confuse them.
In particular, it is important that when we are exploring the first path –
investigating quantum phenomena at what we take to be the most fundamental
possible level of description – we not let our thinking be guided by assumptions
that belong only to the second path. So long as we stay on the first path, in
other words, we are not entitled to attribute the time-asymmetric use of C-
beables but not B-beables to special initial conditions. It cannot be treated as
a “harmless”, non-fundamental time-asymmetry, on a par with that of CEM.18
7 Defending Option III
As we observed above (§4.1), it is easy to argue for Option III by appealing to
ordinary causal intuitions. The problem is to explain why it is those intuitions
that should be regarded as reliable, in preference to the intuition that causation
acts locally – especially if the latter intuition has physics on its side, in the sense
that Option II avoids the tension between AAD and special relativity. Can the
AAD Orthodoxy do better, providing an argument for Option III which does
not simply appeal to intuitions? In this section we want to note two possible
alternative arguments which may be found in the literature. Neither is well-
developed, nor in our view especially successful, but they indicate the territory
the Orthodoxy needs to explore, if it is to put its case on firmer foundations.
7.1 The free will argument
We noted earlier (§2.3) that Bell’s Theorem depends on two crucial assumptions,
Locality and Independence. Option II turns on the proposal that Independence
fails in EPRB, just as we ordinarily suppose that it fails in SEPRB. But it
has been clear since Bell’s original paper [5] that rejection of Independence
provides a formal option for saving Locality. So why have proponents of the
AAD Orthodoxy, including Bell himself, felt able to dismiss this possibility?
For Bell himself, and apparently for many other physicists, a crucial factor
seems to have been the belief that admission of beables correlated with future
measurement settings in EPRB would conflict with free will.19 The argument
that these writers appear to have in mind is based on the claim that if there were
already such a future-dependent beable – call it an “f-beable” – in existence,
whose value was strictly correlated with some future measurement setting, that
measurement setting could not now be freely chosen by an experimenter (or
indeed by a random device of any other kind). If we accept this claim, and
18On which of these paths should we expect to find the Everett interpretation? This is an
interesting question, and although it is off the map for our present purposes (we set aside
the Everett interpretation at the beginning) we stress that we do not mean to exclude the
possibility that the Everett framework provides an example of how an interpretation of QM
can exploit the second path.
19See [6, p. 244] and the remark quoted in [29, p. 241] for Bell’s view on this matter; and
[40] for references to similar views.
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also accept that measurement settings can be freely chosen, then it follows that
there are no f-beables.
We are not aware of any writer, in physics or in philosophy, who has tried
to develop this argument beyond a sketch of this kind. To do so would require
a detailed examination of three matters, each of which would be a substantial
project in its own right: (a) what is meant by “free will” in this context; (b)
why f-beables should be incompatible with free will, in this sense; and (c) what
our grounds are for confidence that there is such a thing as free will, in this
sense. Exploring these issues would be a worthwhile project, in our view; and
is an essential one, for the AAD Orthodoxy, if its argument for Option III is to
rest on the claim that a violation of Independence would be in conflict with free
will.
We offer the following algorithm, in a sceptical spirit, as a way to clarify these
matters. If someone claims that f-beables would be incompatible with free will,
we call their attention to the so-called block universe view, which holds that
the future already exists (inaccessible to us, in most respects, but as real as the
past and the present, nevertheless). We ask them whether they regard the block
universe view as similarly incompatible with free will. If they say “Yes”, we have
reduced their objection to f-beables to a more familiar case, and gained some
justification for setting it aside. Their objection to f-beables is of a piece with
their objection to the block universe, and here we have many allies (including,
apparently, the majority of working physicists). It may be nontrivial to say
how, and in what respect, free will survives the block universe; but for this sort
of opponent, the same answer will serve for f-beables, too. (Perhaps there are
some senses of “free will” which are incompatible with the block universe; but
if we have already abandoned the idea that we have free will in those senses,
they provide no further objection to f-beables.)
The other possibility is that our opponent will say that f-beables pose a
new and greater threat to free will than that posed by the block universe. In
this case, the algorithm recommends that we should challenge the opponent
to justify the distinction between the two cases, without begging the question –
e.g., without simply assuming that causation can only work from past to future
(which is the very question at issue), or that the past is fixed in a way which
the future is not (which the block universe denies).
At present, the free will objection to f-beables seems to rest on strong intu-
itions but weak or nonexistent arguments. We invite those who find it persuasive
to justify their intuitions, and to respond to the challenge that physics is telling
us that our intuitions are mistaken.20 For the moment, our contribution has
been to put that challenge in a sharper form than has previously been available,
by highlighting the choice between f-beables and fundamental asymmetries, in
a case in which our intuitions seem strongly in favour of local explanation.
20We share the sentiment of ’t Hooft [40], who writes: “We dismiss all unquestioned ‘free
will’ assumptions in physics as being not worthy of a mathematically rigorous theory.”
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7.2 Independence and consistency
A second candidate for an argument for Option III turns on the suggestion
that violations of Independence might lead to inconsistencies, or at least to
new difficulties in ensuring the coherence of the theories concerned. Here Tim
Maudlin [21] deserves special mention, not only for articulating a version of
such an argument, but also, more generally, as one of the very few philosophical
proponents of the AAD Orthodoxy who actually offers a serious discussion of
the possibility of abandoning Independence in order to preserve Locality.
Maudlin’s arguments against this possibility (and hence, in our terms, in
favour of Option III) are in two parts. The first part is mainly a criticism of
a particular proposal due to Cramer [14, 15], the so-called Transactional Inter-
pretation of QM.21 The second part is more general, and turns on the idea that
the kind of retrocausality introduced by a violation of Independence introduces
new difficulties in arranging the global consistency of a physical theory:
If the course of present events depend on the future and the shape of
the future is in part determined by the present then there must be
some structure which guarantees the existence of a coherent mutual
adjustment of all the free variables . . .
Local relativistic theories avoid these problems since solutions to
the field equations at a point are constrained only by the values
of quantities in one light cone (either past or future) of a point.
Thus in a deterministic theory, specifying data along a hyperplane
of simultaneity suffices to fix a unique solution at all times, past
and future of the plane. Further, the solutions can be generated
sequentially: the solution at t = 0 can be continued to a solution
at t = 1 without having had to solve for any value at times beyond
t = 1. . . .
Any theory with both backwards and forwards causation cannot
have such a structure. Data along a single hypersurface do not
suffice to fix the immediate future since that in turn may be affected
by its own future. The metaphysical picture of the past generating
the future must be abandoned, and along with it the mathematical
tractability of local theories. [21, p. 201]
But Maudlin’s argument sets the bar too high, in our view. By parity of
reasoning, one could argue that forward causation leads to exactly the same
problems: “Data along a single hypersurface do not suffice to fix the immediate
[past] since that in turn may be affected by its own [past].”22
How is the problem solved in this case? Simply in virtue of the fact that in a
deterministic theory, the data at t = 0 fix not only the data at t = −1 but also
21For responses to this aspect of Maudlin’s argument, see [7 and 19].
22Maudlin has been misled, perhaps, by the attempt to foist an asymmetrical “metaphysical
picture of the past generating the future” on the time-symmetric sense in which, as he himself
puts it, the data “along a hyperplane of simultaneity suffices to fix a unique solution at all
times, past and future of the plane.”
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the data at t = −2, of which the data at t = −1 would normally be said to be an
effect. In other words, the data at t = −2 are not independently variable, in the
sense that would give rise to trouble. Maudlin gives us no reason to think that
the same solution will not work in the opposite direction, to solve the problem
for retrocausality, too.23
This is not to deny that there are deep puzzles in this neighbourhood. Where
does our sense of the direction of causation come from, for example, in such a
deterministic model? What entitles us to regard the Independence-violating
kind of dependence as backward causation? And can we properly speak of
causation at all, without a kind of free will denied to us by determinism?
These issues are important, in this context, for they seem likely to throw
light on both the character and the conceptual cost of the option of abandoning
Independence in order to preserve Locality. They call for far more extensive
discussion than we could hope to provide in this paper.24 We cannot, of course,
rule out the possibility that when that discussion is properly conducted, it will
reveal a decisive reason for preferring Option III to Option II. Our point is
simply that the jury is still out; indeed, it has hardly begun its deliberations.
Until it reports, the case for the AAD Orthodoxy is seriously incomplete.
8 Entanglement and epistemic perspective
We close with an analogy intended to illustrate what we take to be the lesson
of the EPRB/SEPRB comparison, under the assumption that Option II turns
out to be favoured. Imagine a little creature (perhaps a crab) which scans
Figure 2 sideways, from left to right, with a vertical one-dimensional field of
view, collecting information as it goes. Imagine in addition that its access to
the properties of the particles it encounters is incomplete: it cannot observe
the beables directly, but only infer them from the nature of the interactions it
encounters. When its gaze passes the mirror, and moves to the right, it knows
there are two worldlines in view, one oriented upwards to the right and one
oriented downwards to the right, but it cannot see the beables instantiated on
either worldline.25
Suppose that from many similar situations, our creature has learnt the nature
of the correlations in such cases, between the properties of interactions such as
B and C, lying further to the right. It knows, in other words, that in these
circumstances the joint probability of both worldlines continuing in the same
way beyond the polarizers is given by cos2(β− γ). How should it represent this
knowledge, for the use of its own future self? In other words, how should it
23That is, the data at t = 0 fix not only the data at t = 1 but also the data at t = 2, of
which the data at t = 1 would, in a retrocausal setting, be said to be an effect. Again, the
data at t = 2 are not independently variable.
24See [34] and [16] for two recent attempts to tackle these issues.
25Readers who find this example excessively metaphorical may substitute for the sideways
creature a computer which collects all of the information from the spacetime region in question
for a given experiment, and then delivers it to a physicist in slices of position, one position at
a time, moving from left to right.
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write down what it currently knows about the two worldlines, so as to maximise
its own predictive abilities, as its gaze moves further to the right? In particular,
how should it represent the way in which the probability of what it will find at
B will depend on the polarization setting at C, and vice versa? The description
it needs, as we see immediately from our own situation in the case of EPRB, is
an entangled state, representing precisely this correlation between the “future”
(i.e., in the imagined case, rightwards) interactions of one worldline and the
“future” interactions of the other.
Our perspective is not that of this creature, of course. Our gaze crawls across
the diagram from bottom to top, not from left to right. Hence it is easy for
us to see that this creature’s “sideways entanglement” is merely an epistemic
state, a form of representation to which it is forced because, unlike us, it does
not yet know the setting of the polarizer at C or B. But what’s sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. From this little creature’s perspective, it is we
whose gaze moves sideways; and we who assign a merely epistemic state to the
system depicted by the pair of worldlines in EPRB (Figure 1), because we do
not yet know the setting of the polarizer at A or B.
Who gets it right – we ourselves, or this sideways creature? The interesting
possibility, recommended by the evident symmetry between EPRB and SEPRB,
is that both get it equally right, in so far as one can speak of right at all. There
is no single, god-given, correct way to accumulate information in a lattice-like
world of intersecting worldlines. We do it the way we do it because, as structures
within the lattice, we have an orientation which it is not ours to change. (We
do not literally crawl upwards across the lattice, of course. Rather each of us,
in a timeless sense, is merely a sequence of states within the lattice.)
If we want to know what description is really right – i.e., how the world is in
itself – the best we can do is to try to disentangle those elements of the descrip-
tions we find it natural to apply to the world which reflect our own epistemic
perspective, from those which belong to the world in itself, independently of our
perspective. The useful feature of the symmetry between EPRB and SEPRB is
that it makes this task unusually easy, by presenting us with an alternative epis-
temic perspective, a mere rotation’s distance from our own. By asking ourselves
what varies and what is preserved under this rotation, we gain some guidance
about what belongs to our perspective and what to the world in itself.
The answers suggested by the EPRB/SEPRB symmetry are certainly coun-
terintuitive. Entanglement in EPRB becomes merely epistemic, and the under-
lying ontic state of the photons in EPRB comes to depend as much on conditions
in the future as, in the SEPRB case, it depends on conditions to the right. But
it is important to bear in mind two things. First, the proposal also explains
just why we find this so counterintuitive: the intuitions bequeathed to us by
our ancestors have been conditioned since first life by the temporal asymmetry
of our epistemic perspective. Second, if we can free ourselves of the burden of
the ancestral habits of thought, the vista that opens up is very attractive in-
deed. Most importantly, EPRB need no more involve any kind of spooky AAD
than SEPRB does. And with AAD off the table, the second concern about
nonlocality, that it conflicts with special relativity, simply melts away.
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